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Abstract.  Many writers reject the notion of universal human rights, insisting on their historically recent, Western-secular character.  Other theorists emphasise mutual exchange between human rights and systems such as Confucianism, Buddhism, or Islam.  They celebrate a common ground that would appear, moreover, to enhance the case for universality.  This article acknowledges that common ground but rejects the view that it can strengthen the case for universality.  Any such ‘exchange’, far from mutual, turns out to be dictated entirely by human rights.  Familiar rhetoric about the supposed flexibility of human rights law, which would suggest genuinely interactive relationships between it and other belief systems, flatly contradicts its higher-law claims.  Genuinely flexible human rights could only ever arise either (a) in the trivial sense that any broadly formulated legal rule ends up applied to a range of situations, or (b) in the untenable sense that human rights law would accommodate serious violations.
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1.	Introduction
No sooner had the Second World War ended than did René Cassin, Peng Chun Chang, Charles Malik, Eleanor Roosevelt and other prominent humanists set out to draft​[2]​ the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.​[3]​ With General Assembly ratification only months away the American Anthropological Association (AAA) responded sceptically, in 1947, through what would become its controversial ‘Statement on Human Rights’.  ‘Standards and values’, the Statement cautioned, ‘are relative to the culture from which they derive’.  Accordingly, ‘any attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of one culture must to that extent detract from the applicability of any Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as a whole.’​[4]​  Half a century later, acknowledging that appeals to cultural difference often serve to justify heinous abuses, the AAA followed up with its 1999 ‘Declaration on Anthropology and Human Rights’.​[5]​  Grudgingly coming around to the idea of a global corpus, that Declaration falls short of a gleeful conversion.​[6]​  
Scholars still puzzle over the status and impact of one comprehensive value system reigning as global law.  Crucially, however, a contrary approach has emerged.  Rejecting static, ‘museological’ models of culture, scholars today often hesitate to ascribe to a given society or tradition any exhaustive set of ‘beliefs or moral codes’.  Questions about whether Confucianism, Hinduism, Christianity, Buddhism or Islam ‘is’ or ‘is not’ compatible with international human rights law​[7]​ cannot, on that more dynamic view, yield a pat ‘yes’ or ‘no’, as if each of those traditions contained a comprehensive corpus of agreed doctrine.  All have known divergent interpretations throughout their histories.  Cultures are fluid and malleable, readily influencing and responding to each other.​[8]​  
The political theorist Sungmoon Kim observes a split between ‘compatibilists’ and ‘incompatibilists’.​[9]​  Incompatibilists, reminiscent of the 1947 AAA stance, view models of higher-law individual rights as too remote from ancient belief systems, rendering overlaps more illusory than real.​[10]​  Compatibilists, by contrast, identify common ground between earlier traditions and human rights.  The international legal scholar Abdullahi An-Na’im urges us to approach the relationship between human rights and other belief systems not ‘as one of permanent antagonism’, but ‘in terms of synergy and mutual influence’.​[11]​  Compatabilism’s ascendance comes as no surprise.  It holds real appeal in a globalised world where many would feel more comfortable with international regimes rooted in a broad cultural terrain.  Nor is that aspiration altogether new.  Under the 1920 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘the whole body’ of the Court’s membership ‘should represent the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world’.​[12]​  That ideal has persisted into the current Statute of the International Court of Justice.​[13]​  
Suspicions that international human rights law is essentially Western tend to weaken its universality claims, emboldening accusations that it entrenches Western elite interests.​[14]​  Conversely, even though human rights may not trace their historical origins back to Confucianism, Buddhism or other ancient belief systems, they can, on a compatibilist view, claim ethical overlaps with such traditions.  In a nutshell, human rights law cannot claim historical or sociological universality, as if all societies throughout time had maintained full-blown individual rights regimes​[15]​; yet those ethical overlaps do seem to enhance familiar natural law theories​[16]​ by adumbrating the ethical universality of human rights.  That progression from compatibilism to ethical universality seems self-evident.  The less overlap human rights law can claim with other belief systems, the weaker the case for its ethical universality; the greater that overlap, the stronger the case for it.  
In this article I shall nevertheless challenge that logic.  I shall agree that human rights maintain affinities with other belief systems, which might certainly serve the practical aim of promoting popular acceptance of human rights.​[17]​  I shall disagree, however, that those overlaps strengthen any case for the ethical universality of human rights.  As a threshold matter, human rights certainly make no sense as global, higher-order law except insofar as they assume their own peremptory ethical authority as to their central norms.  On their own terms, human rights trump any rival ethics that would, for example, formally admit slavery, child trafficking, or systemic women’s subordination.  In that sense human rights may well coincide with plausible interpretations of various traditions.  The problem for the universality claim is that no ethically tenable reading of human rights, unlike historical customs under other traditions, ever could admit those practices.  Human rights by definition assume their own authority not because of other belief systems, but irrespective of them.  
The reader will be forgiven for wondering whether that point splits hairs.  To the contrary, I shall argue, it cuts to the core of human rights.  Writers like Amartya Sen​[18]​, Charles Beitz​[19]​ and Samuel Moyn​[20]​ embrace what now seems a ubiquitous ‘human rights pragmatism’​[21]​ reflecting workaday human rights doctrine and activism, which fret little over ultimate questions of human ontology.  They just get on with the job.  I shall suggest, however, that those who purport to sidestep such questions, far from overcoming them, only entrench an inadequately examined ethical universalism.  In order to bolster either an acknowledged ethical universalism or an unacknowledged, ‘pragmatic’ one – but, in either case, an ethical universalism that would avoid perceptions of Western cultural imperialism – experts often embrace the supposed openness and flexibility of human rights.  Yet claims of open and flexible rights, I shall argue, amount to hollow rhetoric.  Human rights can be open and flexible only in secondary and trivial ways.  Contrary to two myths, both the naturalist one that rights are ethically universal and the pragmatist one that we can simply avoid the question of universality, I shall suggest that we face a more austere, perhaps counter-intuitive choice.  We certainly can accept human rights law but must deny that it can be called ethically universal.  It represents one among many political systems throughout history – nothing less, but nothing more.  
My aim is not to counter ethical universalism with ethical relativism.  To call human rights one system among many is not to call all systems ethically equivalent.  I shall simply suggest that human rights law must fight its own corner alongside other political systems.  It cannot dodge that battle by suggesting that the idea of human rights inherently compels its own ethical universality, like St. Anselm claiming that God’s existence follows necessarily from His essence, from the ‘very idea’ of what God must be.  Human rights cannot at the same time be, as another common myth would have it, both politically foundational and yet applicable to all societies ‘irrespective’ of their politics.  Human rights law must either remain just as subject to political dialectic as any other reasoned political system – a posture precluded when it is assumed to be ethically universal and therefore necessary by definition – or, renouncing reasoned argument, must be imposed by brute force, like a non-reasoned system.  
Given that other traditions fail to confirm the ethical universality of human rights, they retain normative autonomy.  I shall cast doubt on the ethical universalism of human rights not by waging a point-by-point refutation of naturalist theories.  Rather, insofar as other traditions – with which Western naturalists rarely engage in any systematic way – retain such cultural autonomy, the familiar natural law justifications stand in the same relationship to human rights as those other traditions.  All of them may well lend support to human rights law as one model among many, but none lends support to them as ethically universal.
 
2.	Ethical universality: inductive, deductive, doctrinal, and pragmatic 
The familiar natural law theories of human rights can be called transcendental insofar as they aspire to a deductive, a priori method.  They assume some concept of the ‘human’ to be sufficiently fixed so as to yield general ethical principles.  Naturalists may cite historical, sociological or anthropological findings incidentally, but such data play no decisive role for setting forth those general principles.  Consider, for example, the propositions ‘All organic beings require nourishment in order to survive’ and ‘All humans are organic beings’.  Both are empirical, obtained by investigating a world beyond our thought processes.  However, once we accept them, the conclusion ‘All humans require nourishment in order to survive’ follows without further empirical evidence.  It follows a priori, tautologically, and therefore of necessity.​[22]​  Assume now the further premise that if an organic being requires x in order to survive, then x counts as a human good for purposes of its survival.  What further follows a priori is that nourishment is a human good.  
As has often been noted, however, societies have throughout history developed many ways to manage human goods, only recently doing so through comprehensive regimes of formal, higher-order rights.​[23]​  Casting human goods as objects of rights may prove expedient in a statist and post-industrial era​[24]​; however, even assuming a credibly transcendental foundation for human goods, that same foundation for human rights in no way follows of necessity.  Whether an a priori theory can ground the ethical universality of human rights therefore remains debatable.  My present task is not to pursue that familiar natural law debate, but instead to assess compatibilism as an increasingly popular alternative to the conventional, transcendental naturalism.  
Compatibilists have thus far adopted only inductive, empirical approaches.  That does not mean they run statistical experiments testing propositions from within a given tradition upon a sample population.  Rather, compatibilists investigate beliefs and practices within a given tradition for evidence of its affinities with human rights, without examining the transcendental question as to whether those links exist of necessity, by virtue of what it is to be human.  Of course, there is nothing to stop compatibilists from crossing over to transcendentalist terrain.  Experts on Confucianism or Islam might well propose ethically universalist models derived from Confucian or Islamic principles, which would presuppose a Confucian or Islamic ethics of the ‘human’ as such.  Thus far, however, compatibilists have kept their methods restrained, noting only points of overlap with human rights.  
Inductive reasoning commonly aims at generalizable observations, subject to revision in view of empirical data.  Induction does not, then, equate with particularism.  Compatibilists do not cling so tightly to the traditions they examine as to eschew implications for other belief systems.  Despite the distinct histories of Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism and other traditions, compatibilists converge upon a similar conclusion, namely, that each can fundamentally align with human rights.  An-Na’im, for example, examines Islam solely ‘for illustration, while emphasizing that similar issues arise in relation to other religions and societies.’​[25]​  In contrast to transcendental naturalism, then, compatibilism heralds an inductive, comparative naturalism.  Similarly, Kim’s distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism proves trenchant because the same splits emerge within traditions beyond Confucianism.  To be sure, ‘comparative naturalism’ is not a term compatibilists have used.  Moreover, they rarely avow any transcendental universalism.  However, their writings surely serve to bolster human rights law’s claim to ethical universality, not least because they usually entail traditions covering millions of people, yet in a way different from transcendental naturalism.  An-Na’im, though focussing on Islam, insists that human rights must be legitimated in the context of ‘different religious traditions because of the importance of those perspectives for the vast majority of people around the world.’​[26]​  
It remains questionable, then, whether transcendental naturalism can apodictically ground rights; and yet comparative naturalism faces obstacles of its own.  Compatibilism credibly counters incompatibilism but does not intrinsically refute it.  An-Na’im, Kim, Baderin, and others persuasively argue that one or another tradition can be interpreted to overlap with human rights, but not that it can be interpreted only in that way.  By contrast, any such versatility remains closed to human rights law.  The concept of ‘human rights’ certainly has evolved over time; moreover, its values have at times, like the values of many systems, been invoked to perpetrate rather than to countering violations.​[27]​  By definition, however, human rights law cannot admit interpretations formally contrary to its core norms – say, admitting slavery or child exploitation – without commensurately losing any meaning as human rights.​[28]​  Like transcendental naturalism, comparative naturalism can support human rights, but would equally struggle to establish their ethical universality.  Sheer overlaps fail to ground the ethical universality of human rights law since they are, from the outset, largely dictated and tutored by human rights in a one-way relationship.​[29]​  
Given those deductive as well as inductive roadblocks to demonstrating ethical universality, doctrinal human rights law has all along simply assumed it, just as legal systems generally proceed not via systematic critiques of, but only via the sheer assumption of their ethical underpinnings.  The Universal Declaration attributes ‘inherent dignity’ to ‘all members of the human family’ (preamb. para. 1), proclaiming ‘[a]ll human beings’ to be ‘born free and equal in dignity and rights’ (art. 1).​[30]​  
Compatibilists’ empiricism and their abstentions on transcendental universalism link them strongly to pragmatism.  Human rights pragmatists like Sen, Beitz and Moyn focus on defined policy objectives, skirting a priori debates about ethical universality.  Similarly, in the familiar language of human rights pragmatism An-Na’im writes, ‘the European model of the nation-state has been universalized through colonialism.’​[31]​  Accordingly, ‘there is need for effective protection against excessive or abusive state power.  The corresponding universalization of fundamental constitutional rights through the UDHR is the best available means of providing that protection.’​[32]​  Pragmatists might well accept that, in gritty practice, some rights must at times be sacrificed to secure others; however, nowhere in their writings do we find a single individual on the planet, let alone an entire group or nation, whom they believe ought formally to be denied core human rights.  Nor is it easy to imagine how their approaches could accommodate such an ethics, except in the trivial sense that human rights would merely go by some other name.​[33]​  Following Wendy Brown, ‘purely’ pragmatic grounds for promoting human rights can scarcely count as alternatives to ethical universalism; rather, they become its peremptory agents.​[34]​  To be clear, my aim is not to disparage pragmatism.  It may indeed incarnate ‘the most we can hope for’.​[35]​  In no way eschewing ethical universalism, however, pragmatism joins doctrinalism in defaulting to it.  In the same way, compatibilism assumes ethical universalism by default. 
Far from the two approaches being mutually exclusive, transcendental naturalism must surely welcome comparative naturalism.​[36]​  Yet any intersections between them do little to confirm the ethical universality of rights.  As an initial matter, they could never be merely partial intersections, where, for example, some traditional belief system S would be interpreted to condemn poverty but not women’s subordination.  Even if a transcendental theory T were to admit sex discrimination under exceptional circumstances, the idea that it would accept systemic discrimination would cast doubt on whether it could be called a human rights theory at all.  Through merely pick-and-mix intersections S would serve no more to confirm ethical universality than to undermine it.  Comparative naturalism supports ethical universality only insofar as a given tradition accepts some plausible version of the international corpus as it stands, allowing incidental deviations but not germane ones.

3.	Two precepts of compatibilism
In Wahrheit und Methode Hans-Georg Gadamer famously rejects the view that texts or doctrines draw conclusive meaning from their original sources.  Divergent yet equally credible interpretations of texts or traditions can emerge through shifting historical and cultural contexts.​[37]​  For example, Protestant theology emerging over a thousand years after the New Testament can interpret Scripture as cogently as earlier Roman Catholic or Orthodox schools.  Christianity can claim ethical foundations in Protestantism irrespective of its historical origins.  (Indeed the question as to what counts as an original source, or how to interpret or to prioritise divergent sources, is itself often disputed.)
As an historical matter, the contemporary concept of human rights is commonly thought to trace back to European natural law.  The phrase ‘natural law’ and its cognates droit naturel, diritto naturale, or Naturrecht derive from classical concepts of ius naturale​[38]​, which might seem to stamp human rights with a distinctly Western character.  But following Gadamer, historical origins do not exhaust ethical foundations.  The compatibilist premise seems credible, then, that human rights can claim common ground with, and thereby ethical foundations within, any number of traditions without deriving from them.  An-Na’im, too, distinguishes between historical origins and ethical foundations.  As to historical origins, ‘[t]here is no doubt that the most immediate antecedents and articulation of this concept of human rights have emerged from Western (European and American) experiences since the late eighteenth century.’​[39]​  At the same time, ‘[t]he moral or philosophical foundation and political justification of the conception of human rights as defined by the UDHR can be found in different religious and cultural traditions.  However, since the traditional theology of the major religions of the world, including Christianity, is not readily consistent with this specific conception of human rights, reconciliation will require a reinterpretation of some of the precepts of those religions.’​[40]​  
Following on from compatibilists’ inductive findings, I shall now undertake to propose a few general precepts to characterise comparative naturalism.  I shall start with what seem to be two uncontroversial ones, advancing towards a third, more questionable one.  As certain core naturalist notions do surely recur throughout history and across cultures​[41]​, I shall start a general account of comparative naturalism by proposing a Precept of Basic Naturalism, which can be stated as follows: The adoption of particular norms, judgments, institutions, or practices by a governing authority does not in itself render them just; such authorities are therefore ethically bound to exercise power with justice.​[42]​  
To be sure, concepts like ‘justice’, ‘power’, and ‘ethically bound’ are ambiguous, their complexity compounded across languages, cultures, and historical periods.  Even among people who maintain some notion of justice as distinct from power, some have thought it could be achieved through means scarcely approved by naturalists today, such as through subordination or expulsion of sectors of a population.  Taken in abstraction from the traditions within which it has emerged, the Precept of Basic Naturalism would reduce to an empty formalism.  At the very least, however, it points to widespread beliefs that government is not self-justifying.​[43]​  
The Confucian principle of yì (義, 义), for example, counsels officials to pursue righteousness​[44]​ and xìn (信) exhorts them to integrity.​[45]​  The concept of rén (or jén, 仁) requires persons with authority to exercise ‘benevolence’ or ‘humaneness’.​[46]​  Those concepts, too, are open-ended.  Still, having emerged in periods of conflict and unrest​[47]​, Confucianism resisted sheer acquiescence to warlords or rubber-stamping of ‘might makes right’.  Widespread perceptions of despotism, cruelty or gross unfairness point to violations of the moral order (xìng 性) or the order of nature (tiān 天; tiānli 天吏; dao 道).​[48]​  Meanwhile, teachings within Hinduism, Jainism, Taoism and Buddhism embrace the concept of karma, denoting actions that can be ascertained as right or wrong, benign or harmful, even when human laws fail to reflect those values.​[49]​  In classical Islamic law, the concept of justice (عدل) requires equal application of law (‘fair dealing’) throughout the community of believers.​[50]​  
As ancient schools cannot be condensed into pat phrases, those examples would require sharp and possibly controversial refinement if we wished to delve deeper into their respective traditions.  It is testimony to the complexity of ancient belief systems that they have been invoked both to reject and to bolster arguments for the universality of human rights.​[51]​  Sceptics might ascribe that ambiguity to an intellectual fogginess typical of ‘religion’ as such.​[52]​  Yet ‘secular’ concepts such as ‘liberalism’, ‘democracy’ or ‘capitalism’ just as readily succumb to murky, contradictory, populist, power-political, class-interested, or manipulated interpretations.  Be that as it may, I shall not refer to the various belief systems as ‘religions’, although some compatibilists use the term.  ‘Religious’ is often defined in contrast to ‘secular’, breeding tenuous dichotomies that are neither readily agreed within societies nor easily transposed across them, such as ‘irrational’ versus ‘rational’, ‘supernatural’ versus ‘scientific’, ‘dogmatic’ versus ‘critical’, and so forth.  For present purposes, instead of ‘religions’, I shall continue to use terms such as ‘traditions’, ‘belief systems’, or ‘value systems’.  
Longstanding traditions can rarely be construed as systematic normative canons.  Even a highly axiomatic method, as among Talmudists or Scholastics, cannot be said either to monopolize their respective belief systems nor to represent their actual practices over time.  Outlooks are commonly conveyed through parables, epics, songs, poems, rituals, prayers, commemorations, performances, festivities, shared meals, dress codes, and so forth.  Those elements, too, do not distinguish a system as ‘religious’.  Practices such as recitations, prescribed dress, or commemorative festivities have featured within systems zealously proclaiming their secularism, such as the ‘Pioneer’-type youth leagues of socialist states.​[53]​  More generally, whether an individual, group or community ‘belongs to’ or ‘follows’ any given tradition is not always a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ matter.  As Kim observes, ‘East Asians are saturated with Confucian habits and mores [but] are not Confucians in a philosophically monist and culturally monolithic sense’.​[54]​  Throughout various periods of Chinese history, unlike various monotheistic cultures, some people observed Confucian along with Taoist or Buddhist teachings – teachings often seen as complementary and not mutually exclusive.​[55]​  
As with non-Western traditions, there is no such thing as a unified Western history or worldview, nor, by extension, any grounds for equating human rights exclusively with Western values.  Consider three value systems either influential within or borne out of European history.  Christianity, constitutional democracy, and Marxism scarcely combine to generate a unified account of the West.  Each has hosted internal schisms and each has known strands both receptive and hostile to human rights.  Since various non-Western as well as Western belief systems precede the contemporary international human rights corpus by centuries, compatibilists maintain that those traditions, having evolved throughout their histories in response to new encounters and different beliefs, remain equally open to human rights.  In today’s world the values of human rights contribute to an ethical environment within which older belief systems continue to unfold.  My arguments apply to Christianity, constitutional democracy, or Marxism as well as to Confucianism, Islam and Buddhism.  
All such systems can be rendered compatible with human rights law but none serves, on that basis alone, to strengthen its ethical universality.  With respect to any given belief system, both compatibilists and incompatibilists can effectively accept the Precept of Basic Naturalism, yet disagree on whether it entails human rights.  Proceeding from the point at which the two approaches diverge, I therefore propose a specifically compatibilist position through a second precept, namely, the Precept of Comparative Naturalism, which runs as follows: International human rights law, irrespective of its historical origins, can credibly lay claim to ethical foundations within other belief systems.​[56]​  By ‘other’ I do not necessarily mean ‘all other’.  I seek to synthesise compatibilists’ findings only within the bounds of their own inductive approaches.  

4.	The Precept of Comparative Universalism
For compatibilists the Precept of Basic Naturalism entails the Precept of Comparative Naturalism.  Before progressing any further let’s re-trace that trajectory.  The first step, the Precept of Basic Naturalism, seems uncontroversial: any number of belief systems include values counselling that power be exercised with justice.  For compatibilists, the second step, the Precept of Comparative Naturalism, follows as a matter of course: human rights law, irrespective of its historical origins, can claim ethical foundations within other belief systems.  From the Precept of Comparative Naturalism it might then seem intuitive, for compatibilists, to progress to a further precept.  I shall it call the Precept of Comparative Universalism.  It would run as follows:  Insofar as human rights law, irrespective of its historical origins, can claim ethical foundations within earlier belief systems, arguments for its ethical universality strengthen accordingly.  
Before examining that precept it is worth noting that human rights law is not history’s first value system to claim ethical universality.  The case for ethical universality might be said to advance in particular insofar as it shares characteristics with traditions also possessing universalist elements, albeit not in the altogether benign way that one might imagine.  Despite internationalists’ conventional praise for social diversity, compatibilists focus on a small number of traditions often treated in uncritical, even culturally imperial ways as the world’s ‘major’ belief systems.​[57]​  Yet several such traditions have contributed more to homogenisation than to pluralism throughout history.  Karl Jaspers famously distinguished between a ‘pre-Axial’ age, in which beliefs were essentially local, and an ‘Axial’ age, emerging after the 8th century BCE, witnessing the emergence of value systems spreading over broader land masses and populations.​[58]​  Countless local cultures have been extinguished by larger ones throughout history​[59]​, indeed often via the type of ‘Enlightenment narrative’ often attributed distinctly to the West – in sum, All was barbarism until We arrived.​[60]​  
Much longstanding Islamic doctrine, for example, conceptually divides the globe into Muslim and non-Muslim lands, assigning some civil status to all persons present within Muslim lands.  Similarly, Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, Orthodox Christianity, and Confucianism expanded to cover enormous populations that had once lived under local norms.  They perforce speak about humans in less local, more abstracted, universalist, in Hegel’s sense ‘alienated’ ways.​[61]​  The Welsh farming god Amaethon, able to plough the land as ‘no ploughman’ could do​[62]​, could capture local experiences of land, climate, and related social conditions.  By contrast, that later, Christianised population ended up with the same universalised story of salvation and redemption propagated in Sicily and Sweden, in Mexico and Goa, even despite residues and ‘dialects’ persisting within local practices.  
It is of course customary for ‘major’ belief systems to embrace self-justifying ‘plurality in unity’ tales, and the various leading systems have known periods of greater internal pluralism as well as periods of imposed conformity.  As I have argued elsewhere, even the pluralist periods are more the hallmark of an imperial worldview than a departure from it.​[63]​  As I shall argue in Section 9, human rights law forms no exception.  Recall the PCIJ and ICJ references to the world’s ‘main forms of civilization’ and ‘principal legal systems’, all the more chilling as such phrases are still routinely construed as humanist statements of cultural inclusiveness, hygienically erasing the mass extinctions which they presuppose via the sanitised notion of ‘civilization’.​[64]​  
No stark dichotomy emerges, then, between human rights as agents of hegemony and other ‘major’ traditions as if they stand as unqualified agents of pluralism.  Cultural imperialism has certainly proved aggressive within Christianity, and incalculably so within European post-Enlightenment technocracy, but is scarcely exclusive to the West.  Indeed that latter universalism furnishes a further reason to pause in distinguishing between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ ethics, in view of tens of millions of lives sacrificed to Stalinist, Maoist, and similar religions, as well as Western military campaigns.  Objections to cultural imperialism often come to us less innocently than is sometimes suggested.  Pleas for pluralism and localism at times emanate from exponents of traditions that have scarcely promoted unqualified pluralism in history or today.  For compatibilists within ‘major’ traditions the problem is not to unite fragile localisms with a looming human rights colossus so much as to synthesise other, already substantially universalist systems with a newer one.  Populations living under one or another of the world’s ‘major’ traditions already survived some version of the ‘local versus universalist’ showdown centuries ago.  

5.	Intrinsic hierarchy
In their introduction to a collection entitled Islamic Law and International Human Rights Law​[65]​, Emon, Ellis and Glahn helpfully identify models through which established belief systems are invoked to serve both compatibilist and incompatibilist theses.  Since their book’s focus is on Islam they introduce the models only in a brief, introductory passage, though in terms applicable beyond the scope of any one tradition.  The three authors do not give the models names but I shall do so here based on their depictions.​[66]​
One model of the link between human rights and other belief systems can be called hierarchical.  The authors reject its assumption of a ‘hierarchy of values, where human rights are at the top, and other traditions . . . rise or fall based upon their capacity to meet the standards of the human rights tradition’.​[67]​  Those who embrace the hierarchical model, according to Emon, Ellis and Glahn, ‘proclaim as outdated or inapplicable’ any elements within other belief systems ‘that conflict with the contemporary body of international human rights law.’​[68]​  The hierarchical model ‘assumes either the universality, the truth, or simple authority (if not authoritarianism) of human rights doctrines over and against all other traditions of value.’​[69]​  
That hierarchical model ultimately proves incompatibilist since compatibilists must necessarily shun the deprecation of those same belief systems which they site as overlapping with human rights.  The authors seem to have in mind a human rights zealotry, a liberalism so hard-nosed as to become illiberal.  I shall now therefore propose additional terminology, as we can examine hierarchy within human rights only by distinguishing between two different concepts, which I shall call intrinsic hierarchy and symbolic hierarchy.  I shall argue that any non-hierarchical model would render human rights vacuous.  
Adopting the authors’ terms, we can posit that any agent acting in ‘conflict’ with a norm acts by definition contrary or ‘inapplicable’ to what the norm prescribes.  A norm incorporated within a legal system assumes intrinsic hierarchy insofar as it stands above any non-incorporated rival.  It is difficult to understand how a legal system would otherwise work, including an oral or customary regime.  Consider a norm n1 incorporated into law to prohibit murder.  That norm hierarchically supersedes any contrary, non-incorporated norm n2 that would permit murder, as might for example arise within the honour code of a criminal gang.  To oppose the intrinsically hierarchical character of n1 is to oppose the very possibility of law.  
Even purely facilitative norms, such as procedures incorporated into law for forming marriages or commercial contracts, presuppose intrinsic hierarchy over non-incorporated rivals, since the latter, if followed, may not be enforced.  Some norms may not entail intrinsic hierarchy, as in a gestural resolution passed by a legislature solely to praise services rendered by a deceased member, but most legal norms assume intrinsic hierarchy.  Even an anarchist regime, rhetorically extolling its anti-hierarchical ethos, could only ever preserve itself by placing anarchist norms hierarchically above rivals.  The non-absolute formulation or interpretation of many legal norms in no way alters that attribute of intrinsic hierarchy.  Consider, for example, a norm prohibiting homicide except when necessary to defend human life.  The prohibition assumes intrinsic hierarchy insofar as it stands above any contrary, non-incorporated norm that would permit homicide; however, it assumes no such stature over a concomitant norm permitting homicide when necessary to defend human life.​[70]​  
A 2014 Recommendation issued jointly by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child condemns practices discriminating against women generally and impacting upon girls in particular, including female genital mutilation (FGM), child or forced marriage, polygamy, and honour crimes, all prohibited under international law.​[71]​  Like all norms in the corpus they assume intrinsic hierarchy over unincorporated rival norms, such as local customary norms permitting those practices.  To the degree of such intrinsic hierarchy there can be no such thing as non-hierarchical human rights.  That is a high degree indeed, given (a) the broad content and scope of the international corpus, even on restrained readings, (b) the controversial nature of the interests falling within that corpus; and (c) the claim of human rights to higher-order status, meaning that a human right can legitimately be limited only by another norm of equal status, such as another human right or a formally declared state of emergency within parameters set by human rights law.​[72]​  Law is intrinsically hierarchical and human rights emphatically so.  A traditional value system interpreted to oppose FGM will indeed ‘rise’ to the extent of its accordance with human rights law.  That same system interpreted to support FGM will ‘fall’ in the same way.  How else would any legal system work, let alone one structured upon higher-order norms?  We can just as handily reverse the hierarchy.  From the standpoint of a particular legal system that rejects human rights, it would be the human right that would ‘fall’ against a norm authorising FGM.  To reject that intrinsic hierarchy would necessarily be to prefer or to default to some alternative regime, which, as a legal regime, would just as fully rely on its own structure of intrinsic hierarchy.  Non-hierarchical law is a fantasy.  

6.	Symbolic hierarchy
If compatibilists are to challenge hierarchy within human rights, it cannot be intrinsic hierarchy they have in mind.  No compatibilist has suggested that norms prohibiting, for example, torture, genocide, or discrimination ought not to entail their own intrinsic hierarchy above rival norms, a stance that would amount to repudiating those norms altogether.  Emon, Ellis and Glahn, as compatibilists, presumably target what I am therefore calling symbolic hierarchy, that is, the prospect of some exponent of human rights law rhetorically demeaning other belief systems beyond merely applying rights to concrete circumstances.  Human rights crusaders have certainly been known to hurl slurs such as ‘backwards’, ‘uncivilised’, ‘barbaric’, or ‘medieval’ against traditionalist practices​[73]​, at times overlooking horrors unleashed in the name of human rights.​[74]​  Insofar as human rights, rightly or wrongly, retain a Western veneer, insults to other belief systems resound against a history of actual and perceived Western supremacism.  
Emon, Ellis and Glahn rightly remind us that ethical minefields are symbolic minefields.  We must heed not only the content of rights but also the decorum with which they are advocated and implemented.  Such prudence is sound as far as it goes, but scarcely advances beyond patently crude invective, rarely adopted by serious international organisations.  Of course, no movement of the scale of human rights can account for each of its indiscrete enthusiasts.  More importantly, the documents issued by leading human rights bodies do generally avoid haughty language, preferring the prose of clinical observation.  
Again, when a legal system confronts a controversial problem, it will, as a matter of intrinsic hierarchy, subordinate any rival norms.  As a matter of symbolic hierarchy, that subordination, for those who resent it, readily translates as denigration, regardless of how diplomatically its findings are articulated.  However a report like the CEDAW/CRC Recommendation may be worded, we can hardly overlook its cultural implications.  The voice of sanitised detachment more customary among rights professionals​[75]​ scarcely overcomes symbolic hierarchy.  Some would call it hierarchical oratory par excellence – condemning traditional beliefs by indirection, intimating their savagery without uttering the word.  
Yet a document like the CEDAW/CRC report must somehow explain violations, and must do so with reference to the local values cited to justify them​[76]​, thereby running the risk of appearing judgmental.  A report diplomatically avoiding such reference would paint an incomplete picture, running an equally strong risk of judgmentalism by handling locals with kid gloves, ultimately infantilising them.  Every legal system faces a Hobson’s choice.  Under turbulent circumstances it risks either oppressiveness by candidly imposing its power, or hypocrisy by cloaking its norms in the rhetoric of antiseptic neutrality.  In sum, law begets intrinsic hierarchy, intrinsic hierarchy begets symbolic hierarchy, and symbolic hierarchy risks provoking resistance or resentment irrespective of its rhetorical façade. 
Concern about symbolic hierarchy within human rights remains understandable for two reasons.  First, as mentioned, the authority of human rights law risks diminishing through perceptions of its exclusively Western origins​[77]​; they therefore appear to augment through perceptions of broader ethical foundations.  Second, as a strategic matter, it is understandable that the language and assumptions of human rights may still appear alien in much of the world.  Activists on the ground will cheerfully discard the language of human rights if appeals to local values can more easily engage with those affected.  Still, symbolic hierarchy comes as part and parcel of law, no more avoidable than intrinsic hierarchy.  Nowhere can international law camouflage its hierarchical character less convincingly than in area as symbolically charged as human rights.  Attempts to do so simply by painting a non-hierarchical smile on it become immediately transparent. 

7.	Fluidity, openness, flexibility
Is it possible for human rights law to appeal to the fluidity of ancient traditions, shedding the veneer of hierarchy by sharing the authority of human rights law alongside that of other value systems?  Fluidity within belief systems might seem to point towards such opportunities.  The international corpus certainly has evolved and continues to do so, some of its contours permeable and adaptable.  Ultimately, however, it is mistaken to suggest that human rights law can be fluid in any non-trivial sense.  
Consider a familiar example.  While the corpus requires fair trials even states with the best human rights records diverge on the cases for which that norm prescribes a jury, how many jurors are required, whether their verdict requires unanimity, which evidence is admitted, how appellate procedures work, and so forth.  It seems tempting to cite that kind of example as emblematic of the supposed flexibility of human rights.  But such a characterisation is misconceived.  Rights to fair trials, like other human rights, aim to prevent misconduct by governing and other internationally responsible actors.  Certainly, a range of approaches per se does not suggest that one practice is necessarily more abusive than others.  However, only where differences entail abuse is the right as a human right at issue, for example if a system admits an ex post facto law or imposes no requirement that defendants be informed of the charges against them.  Borderline questions certainly arise concerning the content and scope of human rights, and cultural context may indeed exert an influence at that periphery, but, as I shall argue further in Section 9, that observation only confirms the irrelevance of diverse cultural practice as to core applications where no such vagary exists.  
To pursue that example, if no serious unfairness can be shown to arise from jurisdiction J1 imposing a six month deadline to file criminal appeals, while J2 allows three months and J3 allows nine, then the right to a fair trial remains irrelevant.  One might well celebrate the flexibility of human rights, citing the example that it admits J1 allowing six months’ time while allowing J2 three and J3 nine, but that flexibility begins only where the human right ends.  Norms can only meaningfully be called ‘flexible’ within the scope of their application, not beyond it.  Similarly, to rejoice in the flexibility of human rights by observing that one state combats FGM through poster campaigns while another combats it through professional counselling would be misbegotten in the same sense, as the prohibition simply does not speak to every question of the modalities through which a state may comply.  
Consider a further analogy.  Some people may obey rules against theft by averting their gaze from diamonds and pearls, whilst others may obey by forcing themselves to look at the jewels while internally combatting their urge to steal.  That diversity of approaches adds not a scintilla of ‘flexibility’ to the rule against theft.  The rule can only become flexible under circumstances in which one is authorised to steal, for example to rescue human life.  Similarly, human rights law can be called culturally flexible only to the extent that it does authorise states (or other internationally responsible agents) to wage genocide, to allow FGM, to practice torture, to engineer famines or homelessness, to impose ex post facto criminal convictions, and so forth.  No serious interpretation of the corpus admits such variations in any general terms.
Some might argue that flexibility by definition enters with respect to social and economic rights, often conceived as imposing only ‘progressive’ duties, ‘relative’ to a state’s available resources.​[78]​  That claim might even be augmented, in view of widespread recognition that all rights, including civil and political rights, impose costs if they are to be effectively implemented; and limited resources will inevitably compel choices that presuppose flexibility.  But that concept of flexibility differs from the cultural concept at issue in the assessment of comparative naturalism.  It calibrates human rights performance solely to available funds.  Cultural values may certainly kick in where limited resources compel choices about relative amounts to be spent on various rights, but again only in the obvious sense that international human rights by definition refrain from regulating every detail of their implementation.
Consider two states S1 and S2, both forced to choose between spending on health care and spending on education.  Assume, moreover, that cost poses the only obstacle, that is, no corruption or mismanagement are at play.  It may well be that cultural values induce S1 to spend more on education and S2 to spend more on health care.  However, resting with the assumption that both states are spending on both rights to the maximum of their available resources – simply relying on cultural values to arbitrate between the two duties – the relative and progressive character of the rights precludes any finding of a violation.  To say, in turn, that human rights law escorts us into a sphere in which no violation can be committed is merely to say that it has ushered us into a sphere where it may well advise but does not command.  Here again, it is not technically wrong, but rather substantively trivial to speak of the flexibility of a legal norm when such flexibility begins only beyond the point at which violation of the norm would be ascertained.  Any cultural difference in the sphere beyond which a human rights violation can be committed signifies only an illusory ‘flexibility’.
Whatever different versions Confucianism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, or some other tradition may have taken historically or today, the question is not whether they say the same thing as human rights.  Again, setting aside problems concerning the conceptual, substantive and procedural distinctness of the contemporary human rights corpus, let’s just assume arguendo that various other systems do somehow say the same thing.  The problem is that human rights, through the operation of their own intrinsic hierarchy, remain indifferent to any such overlap.  On their own terms they cannot do otherwise.  Nothing in their content or scope changes if we then, still just for argument’s sake, assume no overlap with other traditions.  For human rights law to depend for its authority upon such overlap, in the sense that it would lose authority where too little overlap existed, would be for it to lose its own self-understanding as law altogether, let alone as higher-order.  There is no serious exchange at all between human rights and earlier belief systems.  That is why, irrespective of how earlier historical influences might once have given birth to human rights, any serious influence, insofar as human rights stand as a comprehensive regime of higher law, remains entirely dictated by human rights to other traditions.  Accordingly, irrespective of its historical origins, but following the Precept of Comparative Naturalism, human rights law can certainly claim strong ethical foundations within other belief systems; but there is no non-trivial sense in which those foundations strengthen arguments for the ethical universality of human rights.  

8.	The apologetic model
Attempts to soften the hierarchical image of human rights emerge within a second model that can be called apologetic, yet which Emon, Ellis and Glahn rightly view with scepticism.​[79]​  The apologetic model is invoked to adopt what we could also call an ‘historical pre-emption’ or ‘We got there first’ thesis, namely, that one or another tradition had ‘espoused human rights protections centuries before those enshrined in Western doctrine.’​[80]​  The model would presumably soften the hierarchical approach by locating various traditions not merely in an overlap with human rights, but, so to speak, in an ‘authorial’ relationship to them.  A given tradition would lay claim to having invented human rights avant la lettre.  
The apologetic model suffers, according to Emon, Ellis and Glahn, because a traditional norm may fail to account for ‘contemporary human rights concerns and aspirations’.​[81]​  Some writers, for example, argue that Islamic standards for women originally surpassed those of prior cultures that Islam overthrew.  For Emon, Ellis and Glahn, that observation fails to suggest that Islamic norms governing women fulfil today’s human rights standards.​[82]​  In sum, the historical pre-emption approach projects backwards onto a tradition tenets it had never held in any form sufficiently recognisable as human rights.  Similarly, as Kim warns, ‘[s]ince Confucianism as a philosophical tradition never constituted its political theory in terms of human rights, it is crucial to refrain from attributing a (seminal) notion of rights to the tradition in general, even if we find what may seem like “rights” in an individual thinker’s philosophical thought.’​[83]​  Kim asks, 
‘[N]oting the virtual absence of the concept of rights in core Confucian classics, some incompatibilists boldly assert that, in contemporary China, the notion of rights is completely irrelevant.  But why should the observation that ancient Confucianism was not constituted around the idea of rights lead to the complete denial of the significance of human rights in modern China, where citizens are now fully aware of the crucial importance of a variety of rights?’​[84]​
The claim of historical pre-emption indeed loses meaning if the values that had supposedly pre-articulated human rights turn out to be comprehensively tutored by them.  Kim abstains on Confucianism as a progenitor of human rights, consigning it to the more tentative double negative of not being incompatible with them.  Similarly, many Jews or Christians today welcome human rights, tracing them back to earlier theologies; however, to view human rights as having always been latently present in Judaism or Christianity is a backwards projection.​[85]​  It is a commonplace for ancient traditions to be viewed over time as flexible, dynamic, and interactive; however, if flexibility merely means that a tradition’s core values are admitted insofar as they recapitulate contemporary human rights, then the hierarchical model has hardly been surpassed.  Any universality ends up resulting merely from a circularity: human rights are universal insofar as they claim ethical foundations within various traditions, yet they claim such foundations only because those traditions have been re-defined by human rights.  
A further problem arises if we consider comparative naturalism not simply as applied to one tradition in isolation but to several collectively.  Insofar as Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and other traditions all turn out to be versions of human rights, they in essence turn out to be versions of each other, an insight serving not to protect cultural difference but to obliterate it, consigning it to a surface appearance.  If I’ve studied Scottish Presbyterianism then I don’t need to study Tibetan Buddhism because deep down they’re all the same.  The old humanist bromide that ‘all the world’s faiths say the same thing’ may assuage sentimental yearnings for world peace, yet so strongly dilutes those systems as to turn them into empty shells, folkloric song-and-dance pastiches devoid of cultural or ethical distinctness.  Ethical universality, far from supplying any foundation, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Even assuming a science-fiction future of normative homogeneity, human rights still could not claim ethical universality.  The potential always remains for one or another strand of any given tradition to rebel against human rights for whatever reason.  The honest response for human rights advocates is not to evade political dialectics by trumping such claims through assertions of universality, but rather to enter into those dialectics by explaining human rights as the best possible regime of justice.  
A global regime that might at first appear to ennoble both human rights and ancient belief systems risks dissolving them into each other.  Universal human rights law risks claiming ethical foundations in earlier traditions merely in the sense of turning them into museum pieces.  Multiculturalism, often portrayed as a counter-balance to liberal secularism, ends up not seriously reflecting different values but rather proving, itself, to be a liberal-secular value outright.  My concern for now is not whether that outcome is good or bad, but to note only that, for better or worse, presenting various traditions as dynamic and adaptable does not overcome intrinsic or symbolic hierarchy within human rights law, a blazingly hierarchical system which we would do better to recognise candidly as such.  

9.	 Flexible universality
Emon, Ellis and Glahn claim, then, to reject the apologetic model, yet Mark Ellis does adopt a ‘flexible universality’ version in a separate piece in their collection, still seeking a less hierarchical universality.  A universal right, Ellis argues, can be ‘applied differently within the context of different cultures, as long as there is good reason.’​[86]​  That view is far from his alone.  It echoes as a widespread mantra vaunting universality and cultural inclusion in equal measure as if those two principles fit hand-in-glove, raising no serious line-drawing question and clashing at worst only in incidental cases; as if the ‘universality versus relativism’ debates were resolved simply by insisting that there is no real conflict at all.  Griffin, too, tellingly phrases such a point as a double negative: the premise that ‘a requirement of universality is built into the idea of human rights does not imply that the content of a human right cannot make reference to particular times and places.’​[87]​  
Under one influential instrument, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA, 1993), ‘[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and [sic] interrelated’.​[88]​  Since all human rights are ‘universal’ they are of equal value in the sense that respect for one in no way compensates for the abuse of another.  That same passage underscores ‘the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds’​[89]​, suggesting, along with Ellis and Griffin, that universality and cultural specificity are not inherently at odds.  
Similarly, the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (UDCD) of 2001​[90]​ reassures us that universality and cultural specificity harmonise with no serious difficulties.​[91]​  The UDCD opens with its first preambular paragraph committing ‘to the full implementation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other universally recognized legal instruments’.  Meanwhile according to Article 4, ‘The defence of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for human dignity.  It implies a commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the rights of persons belonging to minorities and those of indigenous peoples.’  The UDCD includes no suggestion of any fundamental, i.e., more than peripheral clash of such ideals.  The closest it comes to acknowledging any conflict arises in the next sentence: ‘No one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their scope.’
Notwithstanding such proclamations, any examination of ‘flexible universality’ proves it to be more rhetorical than real.  It cannot reverse intrinsic hierarchy nor can it undo symbolic hierarchy except in cosmetic ways.  Consider the example of internationally recognised freedoms of speech and expression.​[92]​  They presumably include the freedom of a Dane to criticise Danish government policy, a Brazilian to criticise Brazilian government policy, a Turk to criticise Turkish government policy, and a Saudi to criticise Saudi government policy.  In each instance, leaving aside pragmatic problems of implementation, the right certainly would be ‘applied differently’ in the obvious sense that Danish, Brazilian, Turkish, and Saudi government policies and societies differ from each other, so the respective dissidents would be saying different things in different environments.  If that is all that is meant by ‘adapting’ a universal right to local circumstances then we are merely applying to human rights law a trivially self-evident principle recognised throughout legal systems over millennia, namely, that a generally formulated norm will apply differently in different circumstances,​[93]​ just as some people will obey a rule against theft by averting their gaze from diamonds whilst others will therapeutically force themselves to look at them.  To call such rules ‘flexible’ through the sheer fact of those different applications is to eviscerate any serious notion of a flexible rule.  Only where the right is applied in some materially different way and in some central (as opposed to a peripheral) application could we seriously talk about flexibility, for example, an interpretation whereby Danes ought to have the right to criticise government policy while Saudis ought not to have it – the type of interpretation that would utterly dismantle global human rights.  One can scarcely attribute to notions of flexibility any non-trivial insight if they expound merely the truism that general rules apply differently in different circumstances.  
Consider another banal analogy.  A speed limit of 30 km per hour on an uphill road will ‘apply differently’ to a 30 km per hour limit on a downhill road, in the sense that the former may accompany pressure on the accelerator and the latter may accompany pressure on the brakes.  Those ‘different applications’ serve not in any relevant way to modify the general rule as a rule.  They do precisely the opposite.  They confirm its uniform meaning throughout different applications.  There is no serious sense, no non-peripheral sense in which ‘flexible’ human rights can mean anything more.  That age-old principle of a general rule’s applicability to different circumstances lies already implicit within the hierarchical model, or at least is no narrower there than under any other model.​[94]​  Imagine that Algerian Buddhists attain religious freedom pursuant to in international human right applied somewhere in Algeria, while Indian Muslims attain the same freedom pursuant the same right applied somewhere in India.  The international right certainly does display two cultural applications, but only in the manifest sense that the right has been applied in two different cultures.  How else would an international right work?  How would a non-flexible alternative work any differently?  If no differently, then the attribution of flexibility loses meaning.  That application too merely follows from the character of a general right as a general rule.  Here too, the reader might wonder whether I am splitting hairs.  Does it matter whether we call rules ‘flexible’ or ‘general’?  But it matters enormously.  The concept of a general rule in no way conflicts with that of intrinsic hierarchy.  Compatibilists’ notions of flexible rules, by contrast, falsely suggest a diminution of hierarchy – and thereby an ethical universality in contrast to a cultural imperialism – that human rights cannot admit in any non-peripheral sense.  
If a Muslim community is granted permission to build a mosque in Rio de Janeiro and a Buddhist community is granted permission to build a temple in São Paolo, that again does not mean in any non-trivial sense that rights to freedom of religion have been ‘applied differently’ to adapt to local circumstances.  It suggests prima facie the opposite, namely, that the right was applied identically, rendering local circumstances ultimately irrelevant, even if they were mentioned and discussed during deliberations and proceedings later forming part of an official protocol.  Any consideration of local contexts in such examples serves not so that the international right has in any non-trivial sense been ‘applied differently’ in the various contexts, but precisely the opposite: its ultimate application has been identical as far as the content and scope of the human right is concerned.
Only if a cultural context were demonstrably to alter a right’s application, yet in a way still deemed compatible with that right, would the notion of a local adaptation carry any non-trivial meaning.  Now assume that (a) Buddhists gain permission to build a temple somewhere in Algeria; but (b) Muslims are denied permission to build a mosque somewhere in India – not through any practical or security obstacle, but solely in view of a local rejection of Islam that is nevertheless deemed under human rights law to be compatible with the international right of free exercise of religion.  Once again, there is little evidence that any basic human right has been authoritatively construed in any such central instance, nor is it apparent as a conceptual matter how such a reading would be possible while preserving any recognisable meaning of international rights.  Similarly, under various cultural rights Chechens may lay claim to preserving their language, and Welsh to theirs, and Navajo to theirs, but again that is not in any non-trivial sense an ‘adaptation’ of those rights; it is those rights in their utterly intended, expected, and routine application.  If those rights are not respected, then we witness not an adaptation but a violation.​[95]​  
‘The key point’, Ellis argues – here too echoing UDCD – ‘is that although the right will be contingent upon culture as a matter of application, it is the particular nature of that right that determines how this should be done.  The right in itself is, therefore, universal.’​[96]​  Such assurances are hard to grasp.  A ‘right in itself’ does not exist as a Platonic Idea.  It lacks any meaning aside from the prospect of its application.  The ‘particular nature’ of a ‘universal’ right by definition includes the condition that it cannot be ‘contingent upon culture’, except again in the self-evident sense of a general rule applied to a given fact pattern.  As with the example of fair trials, there is only contingency upon culture insofar as variations in no way deviate from the core right because, aside from peripheral applications, they start only where the right’s scope of operation effectively ceases.  There is no further cultural adaptation. 
The apologetic rhetoric of flexible human rights, then, does not in any serious way shift universality from a hierarchical to a more open or adaptable model.  It simply paints a symbolically congenial face upon their intrinsic hierarchy.  Suppose again that in order to avoid hostility from constituent communities prosecutions are not brought for genital mutilation (FGM) practiced on underage girls.​[97]​  That certainly would be a genuine cultural ‘adaptation’ of any number of human rights, but scarcely in any sense ‘compatible’ with them.  Any such notion of ‘flexible universality’ would collapse into a purely token acknowledgement of human rights law whilst in fact subordinating it to grievous violations.  Alternatively, allusions to trivial adaptations, as if they support a special case for universality, collapse into rhetorical acknowledgement of cultural diversity whilst in fact subordinating it wholly to human rights, thereby reverting sub silentio back to the hierarchical model.  It is entirely sound that not only outsiders but especially indigenous opponents of FGM would seek to appeal to home-grown values.  That fluidity between human rights and local customs may well prove effective by persuading people that local Christian, Islamic, or other faiths never required FGM and may even forbid it.  Such a pragmatist strategy in no way embodies any serious normative fluidity, which could only mean that there would be some situations in which FGM would be admissible as a normative matter, as testimony to a genuine give-and-take between human rights and other belief systems.  
Perhaps it is not in that domain of heinous abuses, but rather in a more open-ended area that we must search for cultural adaptation?  For Ellis ‘it is entirely consistent with Universalism [sic] to hold that only those with religious objections are permitted to contravene certain standards, such as a Sikh worker wearing a turban on a construction site.’​[98]​  The right at issue is freedom of religion.  We might well witness meaningful adaptation of the right (a) where members of some religions may under some circumstances enjoy rights legitimately denied under the same circumstances to members of other religions.  We can compare that scenario to a trivial one (b) where members of some religions may under some circumstances enjoy rights legitimately denied to other religions under different circumstances. 
We can hardly adopt explanation (a).  For example, as to the construction site scenario the UK has expressly determined that the risk of foregoing a safety helmet, although clearly present, is low enough – presumably within the context of other building regulations – to allow the exemption.​[99]​  The government surely would not allow it if the risk were dramatic and not amenable to reduction through other means, such that large numbers of employees without helmets were killed and injured week after week.  By extension, other states would legitimately disallow the exemption if they lacked alternative means to ensure greater safety.  That would not be a local adaptation, but simply a routine application of a general rule to unequal circumstances.  Those divergent outcomes do not display a universal right adjusted to varying cultural contexts.  They merely display one particular instance of a religious freedom, the freedom to forego a safety helmet on a construction site, which remains subject to health and safety regulations, and which to that extent never seriously fell under any international right at all.  Nor a fortiori can we easily adopt explanation (b), namely, that members of some religions may enjoy an international right legitimately denied to members of other religions.​[100]​  

10.	 Conclusion
Every regime of justice inexorably generates its own propaganda – often phrased in the rhetoric of unity​[101]​ and often so persuasive that we struggle to distinguish values from slogans.  Human rights law proposes a regime of justice.  Its global ambitions inherently spur the classical humanist search for universal inclusiveness.  Conventional natural law theories take up that challenge through a transcendental method.  They assume a sufficiently ascertainable concept of the ‘human’, plausibly claiming some ethics to follow from it, yet less convincingly suggesting how that ethics would a priori generate higher-law rights.  
Comparative naturalism might appear either to complement transcendental naturalism or simply to sidestep questions of universality as human rights pragmatists somewhat unpersuasively purport to do.  Comparative naturalists examine existing, often longstanding belief systems in order to identify common ground with human rights law.  Under the Precept of Basic Naturalism, they certainly can ascertain values within various traditions insisting that power be held to standards of justice.  Under the Precept of Comparative Naturalism, moreover, human rights law can certainly claim ethical foundations within those traditions irrespective of its historical origins.  Comparative naturalists’ inductive method does not, however, equate with a particularist one.  They equally embark upon the classically humanist search for broader applications of their findings to a range of belief systems.  They cannot, however, proceed to a Precept of Comparative Universalism, whereby those ethical foundations would strengthen the case for the ethical universality of human rights.  
The logic dictating that earlier traditions can be rendered compatible with human rights is the same logic which ensures that such compatibility is neither obvious nor inevitable.  The observation that a given tradition may or may not be rendered compatible with human rights entails a flexibility altogether impossible for human rights.  Barring extreme states of urgency there is no serious sense in which human rights law can admit that its core norms may or may not obtain.  Human rights law inherently presupposes its own ethical supremacy and intrinsic hierarchy not through any mutual exchange with other traditions – whatever may be its historical origins or ethical foundations – but wholly irrespective of those traditions.  





^1	  The author thanks Torkel Brekke, Roger Cotterrell, Timothy Endicott, Rebecca Gould, David McGrogan, Mark Wolfgram, and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. 
^2	  See generally, e.g., Mary Anne Glendon, A World Made New (Random House 2001) 21-98.
^3	  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).  
^4	  Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association, Statement on Human Rights, in 49(4) American Anthropologist (New Series) (1947) 539-43.  
^5	  Declaration on Anthropology and Human Rights Committee for Human Rights American Anthropological Association, adopted by AAA membership June 1999, https://www.americananthro.org/ConnectWithAAA/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1880 (retrieved 15 April 2019).
^6	  See below note 100.
^7	  Longstanding debates continue as to the norms that do or should constitute the international human rights corpus.  See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd rev'd edn, Cornell 2013) 26-32, 57-60; Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia 1990) 31-37; James Griffin, On Human Rights (OUP 2008) 9-22.
^8	  See, e.g., Jacques Vanderlinden, Anthropologie juridique (Dalloz 1996); F Pirie, Anthropology of Law (OUP 2013); N Lemay-Hébert, & R Freedman (eds.), Hybridity: Law, Culture and Development (Routledge 2017); R Cotterrell, ‘A Concept of Law for Global Legal Pluralism?’ in S. P. Donlan & L. H. Urscheler (eds.), Concepts of Law: Comparative, Jurisprudential and Social Science Perspectives (Ashgate 2014).
^9	  Sungmoon Kim, ‘Confucianism, Moral Equality, and Human Rights: A Mencian Perspective’ (2015) 74(1) American J. of Economics and Sociology, 149-85, 149-52.  Cf. M. Baderin, ‘The myth of discord’, above n. 11 (distinguishing between ‘discordant’ and ‘concordant’ perspectives on the relationship between Islam and human rights).  Cf. also Abdullahi An-Na’im, ‘The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Co-existence of Islamic Law and State Law’, 73 Modern Law Review 1-29 (2010); Abdullah Saeed, Introduction, in Human Rights and Islam: An Introduction to Key Debates between Islamic Law and International Human Rights Law (Elgar 2018).
^10	  See also Donnelly, above n. 7, 75-93, 133-58; Ludger Kühnhardt, Die Universalität der Menschenrechte (Olzog 1988) 174-278. 
^11	  Abdullahi An-Na’im, ‘Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate’ (2000), 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 95-101, 95.  See also, e.g., Mahmoud Bassiouni, Menschenrechte zwischen Universalität und islamischer Legitimität (Suhrkamp 2014); Abdullahi An-Na’im, ‘Universality and Human Rights: An Islamic Perspective’, in N. Ando (ed.), Japan and International Law (Kluwer 1999) 311-25; Mashood A Baderin, ‘Human rights and Islamic law: the myth of discord’ (2005) 2 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. R., 165-85 (hereafter ‘The myth of discord’); Anver Emon, Mark Ellis and Benjamin Glahn, ‘From “Common Ground” to “Clearing Ground”: A Model for Engagement in the 21st Century’, in A. Emon, M. Ellis, & B. Glahn (eds.), Islamic Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2012); David Loy, ‘A different “enlightened” jurisprudence?’ (2010) 54 St Louis U. L. J. 1239-56; Abdullahi An-Na’im, ‘Complementary, Not Competing, Claims of Law and Religion: An Islamic Perspective’ (2013) 39 Pepperdine L. R. 1231-56 ; Mashood A. Baderin, (2005) International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford: OUP).
^12	  PCIJ Statute (1920) art. 9. 
^13	  ICJ Statute (1946) art 8.
^14	  See, e.g., Makau w Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’ (2001) 42 Harvard Int’l L. J. 201-45; Wendy Brown, ‘The Most We Can Hope For...: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism’ (2004) 103(2-3) South Atlantic Q. 451-63; Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 2007); Ibrahim Aoudé, ‘The Iraq war in the context of global capitalism’ (2016) 10(1) Int’l J. Contemporary Iraqi Studies 139-152; Susan Marks, “Human Rights and Root Causes” 74 Modern Law Review (2011) 57-78; Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Cornell 2013).
^15	  See above n. 10. 
^16	  See, e.g., Griffin, above n. 7; John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd ed. OUP 1980); John Tasioulas, ‘On the Nature of Human Rights’, in G. Ernst, & J.-C. Heilinger (eds.), The Philosophy of Human Rights (De Gruyter 2012); John Tasioulas, ‘On the Foundations of Human Rights’, in R. Cruft, M. S. Liao, & M. Renzo (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (OUP 2015).
^17	  See, e.g., An-Na’im, above n. 11, at p. 96.
^18	  See, e.g., Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Belknap 2009)
^19	  See, e.g., Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (OUP 2011).
^20	  See, e.g., Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History (2nd rev’d ed. Verso 2017) 169-81.  See also, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton 2001).  Donnelly proposes a more descriptive analysis, much of which, however, chimes strongly with pragmatism.  See, e.g., Donnelly, above n. 7, 75-118.
^21	  Cf., e.g., Geoff Dancy, ‘Human rights pragmatism: Belief, inquiry, and action’, 22(3) European J. Int’l Relations, 512-535.
^22	  See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 6.1 – 6.13 (1st edn Kegan Paul 1921; Suhrkamp 1984), 70-76 (explaining the tautological character of logical deductions).
^23	  See above note 10. 
^24	  Cf. below text accompanying notes 31 - 32.
^25	  An-Na’im, above n. 11, 95.
^26	  Ibid., 100.
^27	  See below note 77.
^28	   Even derogations stand not outside human rights law but as part and parcel of it.  See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, art. 4.  But cf. Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie (first published 1922, 9th edn. Duncker & Humblot 2009) (suggesting that rights-based regimes are therefore self-contradictory).
^29	  See further below, Section 8.
^30	  Cf. Pieter van Dijk (1995), ‘A Common Standard of Achievement: About Universal Validity and Uniform Interpretation of International Human Rights Norms’, 13(2) Netherlands Q. Hum. Rts. 105-21.
^31	  An-Na’im, above n. 11, p. 97.  An-Na’im’s reference here to ‘universali[sation] through colonialism’ is, too, empirical and therefore contingent.  It remains debatable whether or how the ‘European model of the nation-state’ might yield to alternatives.
^32	  Id.
^33	  By analogy, we can claim to ignore the abstract question as to whether a legally enforceable agreement presupposes contractual consideration.  However, if we then proceed to adhere ‘pragmatically’ to courts that (a) constantly enforce contracts containing consideration and (b) constantly set aside contracts that do not, then, far from avoiding the question, we have resolutely answered it.  
^34	  See Brown, above note 14.
^35	  Cf. Ignatieff, above n. 20.
^36	  Cf., e.g., Griffin, above n. 7, pp. 137-42.
^37	  Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (4th ed. Mohr-Siebeck 1986) 312-46.
^38	  See, e.g., Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights (Emory University Press 1997). 
^39	  See An-Na’im, above n. 11, pp. 95-96.  Cf. Michel Villey, Le Droit et les droits de l’homme (PUF 1983) 131-54 ; Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (Norton 2007).  Some writers trace the chronology of human rights back to Islam.  Baderin cites Briffault’s view that human rights represent ‘the quintessence of what the intelligentsia of Mediaeval Europe acquired from Islam over a period of centuries through the various channels of Muslim Spain, Sicily, the Crusades; and of the ideals propagated by the various societies that developed in Europe in the wake of the Crusades in imitation of the brotherhood associations of Islam.’  Baderin, ‘The myth of discord’, above n. 11, pp 168-69 (see also Baderin’s reference to Ostrorog, id. at 169).  Any disagreement on that history between Baderin and An-Na’im need not be settled here.  It is ethical foundations that are of greatest interest precisely because they can be claimed irrespective of historical origins.  
^40	  See An-Na’im, above n. 11, p. 96 (original emphasis).
^41	  See Kühnhardt, above n. 10, pp. 290-94.
^42	  My aim for now is not to critique that precept, but only to observe that some form of it recurs in a range of belief systems.  Recall, of course, provocateurs from Callicles and Thrasymachus to Nietzsche and Schmitt (not omitting the ironic Machiavelli of The Prince) denying the notion of justice altogether or collapsing it into the choices of those who exercise power.  The Precept of Basic Naturalism presupposes by definition some concept of justice at least quasi-independent from the exercise of power.  
^43	  See Kühnhardt, above n. 10.
^44	  See, e.g., Chi Hsu and L Tsu-Ch’ien, Chin-ssu lu (Reflections on Things at Hand) (Wing-tisit Chan trans. Columbia 1967) 14-15; Kim, above n 9, 157, 159, 162, 175.
^45	  See, e.g. id. at 177,191, 220.
^46	  See, e.g. id. at 62, 67, 136, 153, 160, 266; Cf. Kim, above n 9, 157, 159, 162, 164, 173.  
^47	  See, e.g., Michael Schuman, Confucius and the World He Created (Basic Books 2015).
^48	  See, e.g., Hsi & Tsu-Ch’ien, above n 44, 5-34; cf. Kim, above n 9, 15.
^49	  See, e.g., Loy, above n 11, 1245-47.
^50	  The Qur'an 16:90 (M. A. Abdel Haleem, trans. OUP (2004) 172.
^51	  See, e.g., Kim, above n 9, at pp. 149-51.
^52	  See, e.g., Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Penguin 2006).
^53	  See, e.g., Barbara Felsmann, Beim kleinen Trompeter habe ich immer geweint: Kindheit in der DDR – Erinnerungen an die Jungen Pioniere (Lukas Verlag 2003).
^54	  Kim, above n 9, 151-52. 
^55	  See, e.g., Wing-Tsit Chan, ‘Introduction’ in Hsi & Tsu-Ch’ien, above n 44, xvii – xli.  
^56	  Subsequent to one of the first major international conferences examining human rights and Islam, the published contributions anticipated the Precept of Comparative Naturalism.  In the authors’ view, ‘it is high time to declare null and void the idea that the essence of the concept and the process of human rights issues from a uniquely Western heritage’.  As the collection was simultaneously issued in English and French, I translate here the French (‘ . . . il est grand temps de déclarer nulle et fausse l’idée que l’essence du concept et du processus des droits de l’homme est un patrimoine uniquement occidental’) since the concepts of ‘essence’ and ‘patrimoine’ (‘heritage’) easily accommodate a notion of ethical foundations claimed regardless of historical origins.  Commission Internationale de Juristes et al., Les Droits de l’homme en Islam (ICJ 1980) 3.  By contrast, the more strictly chronological wording of the English version (‘the idea that the initiation and continued development of the concept of human rights must be attributed exclusively to Western culture’) tends to collapse ethical foundations into historical origins (‘initiation’).  International Commission of Jurists et al., Human Rights and Islam (ICJ 1980) 3)   Cf. below Section 8.
^57	  See above, text accompanying note 40.
^58	  Karl Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, in 10 Karl Jaspers Gesamtausgabe (Kurt Salamun, ed. Schwabe Verlag 2016).
^59	  Cf., e.g., Eric Heinze, Review Essay (reviewing I. Schulte-Tenckhoff, La Question Des Peuples Autochtones) (1999) 46 Netherlands J. of Int’l L. 269-76; Eric Heinze, ‘Truth and Myth in Critical Race Theory and LatCrit: Human Rights and the Ethnocentrism of Anti-Ethnocentrism’, (2008) 20 Nat’l Black L. J. (Columbia University edition)107 – 62, 131-33.
^60	  Cf., e.g., Eric Heinze (2009). ‘Imperialism and Nationalism in Early Modernity: The “Cosmopolitan” and The “Provincial” in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline’, 18(3) J. of Social & Legal Studies 139 – 68; Eric Heinze, ‘He’d turn the world itself into a prison: Empire and Enlightenment in Jean Racine’s Alexander the Great’ (2010), 4(1) L. & Humanities 63-89.
^61	  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (first published 1807, Felix Meiner Verlag 1999) 116-22. 
^62	  Culhwch ac Olwen (ca. 1150 CE) (W Parker, trans. 2016), http://www.culhwch.info/index.html 
^63	  See above note 60.
^64	  See above text accompanying notes 12-13.
^65	  Emon, Ellis, & Glahn, above n 11, at pp. 2-4.
^66	  Emon, Ellis, & Glahn are not the first to propose such a topology (see, e.g., Baderin, International Human Rights, above n. 11, at 13-16) but theirs handily suits a range of belief systems.  
^67	  Id at pp. 2 – 3. 
^68	  Id at p. 2.  
^69	  Id.  Cf.  above note 14.  We might hesitate about that reference to traditions ‘of value’.  Is every tradition valuable?  If so, then how do we account for some bleak ones?  If not, then who is to perform the triage, according to what criteria, particularly in view of conflicting strands within any given tradition?  If those criteria draw from human rights law, then the supposedly challenged hierarchy ends up altogether maintained. 
^70	  Because conflicts at times arise between incorporated norms, adjudication preserves intrinsic hierarchy through rules of decision.  Of course, not all law operates via norms trumping rival norms.  Procedures of deterrence, diplomacy, negotiation, settlement, alternative dispute resolution, or truth and reconciliation are well known, but operate only against the background of binding norms presupposing intrinsic hierarchy.  Human rights law does accommodate conciliatory processes, such as mediation between disputing entities.  On its own terms, however, it cannot go so far as to endorse a compromise such as a pledge to torture only a small number of individuals in exchange for cessation of hostilities, even if some diplomats might informally shake hands on such a deal.  Accordingly, by way of comparison, we may certainly view a standard body of contract or property law as flexible, at least beyond a few basic principles.  We may believe that much of it can be amended or abrogated easily, even for purposes of sheer expedience.  That impression changes, however, once the norms at issue claim fundamental or higher-law status deriving from essential human attributes.  For norms of that type we might expect change in the sense of organic evolution, usually in an expansive direction, or in purely peripheral or pragmatic aspects.  What we do not expect is flexibility at the core of a genuinely fundamental, higher-order right.  See further below, Sections 7 - 9.
^71	  Joint General Recommendation No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women / General Comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, 14 November 2014 (hereafter ‘CEDAW/CRC report’). While such a report carries no binding force, both committees are widely viewed as issuing authoritative interpretations of their respective conventions.
^72	  See above note 28.
^73	  See, e.g., Will Worley, ‘Campaigners call for “barbaric” male circumcision to be treated the same as female genital mutilation’, The Independent, 31 May 2017, retrieved 15 April 2019 from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ americas/male-circumcision-female-genital-mutilation-fgm-treated-the-same-campaigners-a7765126.html.
^74	  Programmatic justice regimes, from Plato to Kant to Marx to Rawls, are invariably presented as the straightforward opposite of injustice and therefore solely as combative of injustice.  However, as I have argued elsewhere, any regime of justice necessarily produces central injustices that it would purport to combat.  That observation, too, renders neither justice futile nor all regimes ethically equivalent, yet there is no way in which human rights law would end up magically exempt.  See Eric Heinze, The Concept of Injustice (Routledge 2013) [hereafter Injustice]; Eric Heinze, ‘What is the Opposite of Injustice?’, 30:3 Ratio Juris (2017), pp. 353–371.  Cf. below note 77.
^75	  The report claims, for example, ‘Female genital mutilation, female circumcision or female genital cutting is the practice of partially or wholly removing the external female genitalia or otherwise injuring the female genital organs for non-medical or non-health reasons.  […]  It may have various immediate and/or long-term health consequences, including severe pain, shock, infections and complications during childbirth (affecting both the mother and the child), long-term gynaecological problems such as fistula, psychological effects and death. The World Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund estimate that between 100 million and 140 million girls and women worldwide have been subjected to a type of female genital mutilation.’  CEDAW/CDC report, above n. 71, 6-7.
^76	  Id. 3, 7, 15-16, 22.
^77	  International human rights law has certainly been accused ‘authoritarian’ leanings, as when its values were invoked in 2003, backed by the military might of a US-led coalition, to invade Iraq, bringing Saddam Hussein’s rule to an end.  See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ‘War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention’ (25January 2004, retrieved 15 April 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/01/25/war-iraq-not-humanitarian-intervention; Kenneth Roth, ‘Was the Iraq War a Humanitarian Intervention?’ (2006) 5(2) J. Military Ethics 84-92.  Some writers deem such intervention to be unjust not only in itself but in the broader sense of serving a global project of liberalised markets favourable to the West, to the detriment of poorer populations.  See, e.g., Aoudé, above n. 14.  That spectre of authoritarianism might seem to cast doubt on human rights law altogether and a fortiori on any claim to ethical universality.  Strictly speaking, however, it casts doubt on neither.  If we wish to challenge universality we must look elsewhere.  Indeed, some protagonists have argued that human rights claims did suffice to justify the Iraq invasion, in view of Saddam’s atrocities.  For argument’s sake, however, let’s reject that view.  See, e.g., Brown, above note 14, at 462 n. 4.  It remains a commonplace that any vast and complex system of social or legal norms, encompassing manifold actors often working at cross-purposes, will at times abuse the system’s norms.  In view of the range of problems with which international human rights are charged, many observers have acknowledged such misappropriations without, however, reaching the conclusion that the entire international human rights project either fails or proves authoritarian.  Emon, Ellis and Glahn condemn such abuses without rejecting the entire notion of human rights.  Cf., e.g., Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law (2nd ed. Longman 2010) 914-16.  Human rights law stands foursquare alongside other belief systems whose adherents freely acknowledge abuses without thereby abandoning the belief system altogether.  
^78	  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNGA resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 (entry into force 3 January 1976), art. 2(1).
^79	  Emon, Ellis, & Glahn, above n 11, at pp. 3-4.
^80	  Id at 3.
^81	  Id.
^82	  Id.
^83	  Kim, above n 9, at p. 151.
^84	  Id.  Cf. Leila Choukroune, ‘The Language of Rights and the Politics of Law’, (2016) 29 Int’l J. Semiotics L. 779–803, 785-89.
^85	  Cf., e.g., Griffin, above n. 16, p. 278 (challenging Finnis’s attribution of a human rights concept to Aquinas).
^86	  Mark Ellis, ‘Islamic and International Law: Convergence or Conflict?’, in Emon, Ellis, & Glahn, Emon, above n 11, 91-103, at 97 (emphasis added).
^87	  Griffin, above n. 16, p. 38 (emphasis added).
^88	  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA), adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993, para. 5.  Cf., e.g., Asbjørn Eide, ‘Interdependence and Indivisibility of Human Rights’, in Yvonne Donders and Vladimir Volodin (eds.), Human Rights in Education, Science and Culture: Legal Developments and Challenges (Ashgate 2007) 11-52.
^89	  VDPA para 5.
^90	  UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO Doc. 31C/Res 25, Annex 1 (2001).
^91	  The UDCD does not carry the legal authority of instruments such as the UDHR or the leading international covenants.  Those claim intrinsic hierarchy within international law in a way that a UNESCO Declaration, without more, cannot ordinarily do.  Yet nor can UNESCO’s approach to human rights be dismissed.  The UDCD is visibly drafted by initiates, presumably with the aim of it acquiring at least hortatory status.  I cite it here not as binding law but only because it captures notions of flexible norms widespread among human rights professionals, along the lines adumbrated by Ellis, Griffin, and others who wish to soften appearances of hierarchy or cultural imperialism within human rights.
^92	  See, e.g., UDHR art. 19; ICCPR, art. 19(1) - (2). 
^93	  See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics V:3-4, 1131a10-1132b21, in Aristotle, 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle (first authored 4th century BCE, Jonathan Barnes, ed. PUP 1984, 1785-87.
^94	  Griffin does distinguish between ‘basic rights’ and ‘applied or derived rights’:‘Rights may be expressed at different levels of abstraction.  The highest level would emerge when we articulate the values that we attach to agency: [namely,] autonomy, minimum provision, and liberty.  Then less abstract charcterizations would come about as a result of the application of these highest-level considerations with increasing attention to circumstances.  […]  We should expect abstractly formulated rights, when applied to the conditions of a particular society, to be formulated in the language of its time and place and actual concerns […] We should claim only that the universality is there at the higher levels.’  Griffin, above n. 16, p.  50While that account may capture Ellis’s meaning, such a view still fails to move us beyond what the hierarchical model already contains.  
^95	  Under the European Court’s ‘margin of appreciation’ or some cognate de jure or de facto principle applied outside Europe, a human rights body may indeed take local circumstances into account.  See, e.g., Andrew Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law (OUP 2012).  On closer examination, however, it does so only in the age-old sense that any established legal system must always take particular circumstances into account.  That does not mean that the jurisprudence produced is particularly coherent; scholars have long noted cases that conflict. See, e.g., Uladzislau Belavusau, ‘Perinçek v. Switzerland: Between Freedom of Speech and Collective Dignity’ (5 Nov 2015, retrieved 15 April 2019) Verfassungsblog: https://verfassungsblog.de/perincek-v-switzerland-between-freedom-of-speech-and-collective-dignity/.  But those objections, far from supporting any axiom of cultural adaptation, merely confirm the altogether familiar expectation that a general rule should be applied consistently: similar applications to similar cases, dissimilar applications to dissimilar cases.  Never has a recognised human rights doctrine expressly (a) accepted as valid a claim made by a citizen C1 of state S1; and (b) recognised a claim by citizen C2 of state S2 to be in relevant respects the same as the claim of C1; while (c) nevertheless rejecting as invalid the claim of C2 solely on grounds of cultural context.  Even when it purports to take account of local circumstances, the supervisory body argues in such situations that the two claims are not the same.  One might certainly argue (looking in from the outside) that such a body really is just adapting general rights to local circumstances, but the fact that leading bodies never expressly adopt any such rationale suggests it plays no recognised role in the conception, interpretation or jurisprudence of human rights – no recognised role in the normativity of human rights.  Cultural adaptation surely abounds in human rights sociology but remains largely irrelevant to formally recognised human rights normativity.  Accordingly, if that human rights body merely wished to feign such an outcome, it would instead concoct some distinguo in the fact pattern in order to render the two claims not the same; and if they are not the same, then by definition there is no meaningful sense in which the same claim is being treated differently in order to facilitate a cultural ‘adaptation’.  Of course, such bodies never admit to such tinkering.  There is no way to identify it except via informal disclosures such as careless slips and leaks, behind-the-scenes gossip, or post hoc confessions.  If such fixes supply the only real path to ‘cultural adaptation’, then the only – rather unflattering – basis for ‘flexible universality’ is that it exists to the extent that an oversight body willingly lies about what it does.  Legal sociologists, realists, or pragmatists may see little harm done, but those approaches would have to step outside what ‘flexible universality’ expressly promises, which is to achieve cultural adaptions as part of human rights doctrine, and not in spite of it.
^96	  Ellis, above n. 86, p. 97.
^97	  For present purposes that supposition is intended hypothetically since other social factors may render prosecutions more complicated.  See, e.g., H Summers, ‘Those involved in FGM will find ways to evade UK law’ (2018, March 7, retrieved 15 April 2019) The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/mar/07/reported-cases-fgm-rise-sharply-uk-no-court-convictions .  
^98	  Ellis, above n. 86, 97 (emphasis added).  Only those?  But then which religions or belief systems count?  Why not include persons claiming other types of conscientious exemptions?  After all, ‘freedom of conscience’ appears alongside ‘religion’ as a protected right.  UDHR art. 18; ICCPR art. 18(1).  Nowhere does human rights law formally accord greater status to religious over non-religious convictions.  All such objections to the regulation would become equally valid, underscoring that the safety concerns are negligible from the outset and therefore simply do not pose any real obstacle to the exercise of the human right.  Lawyers may respond to that slippery slope objection, arguing that the problem is merely one of ‘line drawing’ as witnessed throughout law.  However, unless any such line-drawing expressly contradicts the right, a particular problem if a right is genuinely higher-order, there is no obvious ‘cultural adaptation’ at work, but merely a routine determination of the content and scope of the right.  The apologetic model does not, then, alter the hierarchical one.  
^99	  See, UK Health and Safety Executive, ‘Head Protection for Sikhs wearing turbans’, n.d., http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/og/og-00003.htm (retrieved 15 April 2019).
^100	  The myth of human rights as both deeply universal and broadly inclusive of other traditions serves also to frustrate the 1999 AAA Declaration, which adopts a concept of ‘culture’ either so vast as to become vacuous, or scarcely subtler than the museological model of the 1947 Statement.  On the one hand, the 1999 position presents the ‘capacity for culture’ as an ultimate human good that, in turn, justifies human rights.  On the other hand, that capacity ends up violated ‘by states and their representatives, corporations, and other actors’. (above, n. 5)  Yet those actors stand within culture, not outside it.  They embody altogether central forces of culture.  The violation of someone’s ‘capacity for culture’ is itself a phenomenon of culture.  Perpetrators who violate others’ capacity for culture turn out, through those violations, to exercise their own ‘capacity for culture’.  The only discernible ethics becomes, ironically, the one we would least associate with contemporary anthropology, namely, an arch-universalist, abstract Millian liberalism, whereby I get to exercise my ‘capacity for culture’ only insofar as it does not harm yours, a formula famously leaving its own notion of ‘harm’, and of authority to determine it, ill-defined.  Cf.  Eric Heinze, ‘Victimless Crimes’, in Ruth Chadwick, et al. eds., 4 Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics (2nd  ed. Elsevier 2012) 471 – 82 (challenging Mill’s concept of harm).  In addition, how the AAA deems its formulaic stance to possess ‘universal relevance’ while eschewing ‘the abstract legal uniformity of Western [sic] tradition’ (id.) becomes equally difficult to fathom.  Indeed the absence of the customary definite article before ‘Western’ seems aimed at avoiding an embarrassing cultural essentialism; yet if the omission is only a typographical error, then the essentialism appears all the more decisive.  
^101	  Cf. Heinze, Injustice, above n. 74, at 50-78; Heinze, ‘Imperialism and Nationalism’, above n. 60, 379, 388; Heinze, ‘He’d turn the world itself’, above n. 60, 72, 88. 
